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Recent Decisions
Admiralty - Jurisdictional Requirements. Weinstein v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F. 2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963). Libellant's decedents were
passengers on a scheduled aircraft flight from Boston to
Philadelphia. Shortly after take-off, the aircraft crashed
into Boston harbor, within one marine league of the shore,
thus precluding a cause of action under the Federal Death
on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958). All passengers were killed. Libels in personam were filed in admiralty alleging two causes of action, one being negligence
in maintenance, operation and navigation of the aircraft,
the second being a contract action for breach of warranty
and contract. Although the District Court, 203 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Pa. 1962), found that the locus of the crash was on
navigable waters, it nevertheless, citing McGuire v. City
of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. N.Y. 1961), held that
for admiralty tort jurisdiction to apply, there must be some
maritime connection and/or wrong in addition to maritime
locality. Maritime connection was defined as conduct which
relates to or is involved with shipping, vessels, commerce
or the business of the sea. Failing to find such maritime
connection between this aircraft flight and the tort, and
finding that the contract subject matter in no way related
to maritime service or obligation, the District Court held
both claims non-justiciable in admiralty.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
judgment on the contract action of the District Court, stating that a contract or warranty relating to the physical
structure of a land-based aircraft, "and a contract of carriage by air between two cities on the United States mainland are not maritime in substance. . . " Such contracts
do not acquire maritime flavor from a brief flight over navigable waters. The court, however, declined to decide
whether similar contracts would be maritime in substance
where the flight was primarily trans-oceanic. In reversing
the District Court's judgment in regard to libellant's tort
claim, this court, following precedent, essentially states
that the time and place of impact, where the negligent or
intentional force affects the person and/or where the injury is sustained, determines the locus of the tort for admiralty jurisdiction. That the locus of the tort, however
occurring and whether or not related to shipping matters or
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vessels, is the prima facie test and is sufficient alone for
admiralty tort jurisdiction to apply, see: Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); The Plymouth,
70 U.S. [3 Wall.] 20 (1865); Comment, 55 COLUM. L. REV.
907, 918 (1955), and 24 MIcH. L. REV. 405 (1926).
Automobiles - Virginia's "Implied Consent" Law As
Pertains To The Obtaining Of A Chemical Test For Intoxication Or The Forfeit Of Driving License Held Constitutional. Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133
S.E. 2d 315 (1963). In 1962 Virginia passed an "implied
consent" statute, 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-155 (Supp. 1962),
in an attempt to stem the growing number of fatalities on
its roads. The Virginia Advisory Legislative Council, aware
of the fact that alcoholic intoxication was a frequent contributor to the present carnage on the highways, had
strongly recommended the legislation. It was passed by
a large majority in both houses of the Virginia Legislature.
See Comment, Virginia's Implied Consent Statute: A
Survey and Appraisal, 49 VA. L. REV. 386 (1963). The
statute, basically, requires a motorist, when arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol, either to submit
voluntarily to a chemical test for intoxication (which can
be used as evidence against him) or forfeit his driving
privilege for a required period of time. In the instant case,
Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals held the statute, in
its entirety, to be neither a violation of the Federal Constitution or of the Constitution of Virginia.
Virginia is one of the growing list of states to pass such
statutes and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is,
likewise, another highest state court to uphold their
validity. The constitutional arguments against these
statutes, based principally on the 4th and 5th Amendments
to the Federal Constitution, have been rejected by the
following cases: Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 172
Neb. 415, 110 N.W. 2d 75 (1961); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566,
358 P. 2d 765 (1961) and State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.
2d 1065 (1958). These cases and others are fully explored
in, Annot., 88 A.L.R. 2d 1055, 1065 (1961). While the
Supreme Court has never held directly on the issue of
these statutes, there is substantial reason to believe that
the court would uphold their validity. See: Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245 (1910), and the analysis in 49 VA. L. REV. 386, 388
(1963).
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In the 1964 session of the Maryland Legislature, H.B.
59 was introduced, which, if adopted, would give Maryland
a similar "implied consent" statute. It was defeated on
the floor of the legislature after an unfavorable committee
report. In Maryland in 1963, there were 596 people killed
on the highways. It is estimated that alcoholic intoxication
was a significant contributing factor in 40% of these fatalities. (Statistics, courtesy of Maryland State Police).
For further reference, especially as to the constitutionality problem see: 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2265
(M'Naughten Rev. ed. 1961); Slough and Wilson, Alcohol
and the Motorist: Practicaland Legal Problems of Chemical
Testing, 44 MIN. L. REV. 673 (1960); Burgee, A Study of
Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication, 17 Md. L. REV.
193, 206 (1959) and Note, 37 N.D.L. REV. 212, 232 (1961).
Constitutional Law - Fluoridation Of Public Water
Supply Held To Be A Reasonable Use Of Police Power.
Schurings v. City of Chicago, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2478 (March
24, 1964). Appellants brought a taxpayers' action to enjoin
the city of Chicago, through its Department of Water and
Sewers, from fluoridating the city's water supply. Their
contentions were that fluoridation was an unreasonable
exercise of the police power and an infringement on their
fundamental liberties protected by the constitutional guarantees of due process of law. The Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed the lower court decision against the appellants and
concluded that since artificial fluoridation of water had
been proven, to its satisfaction, to be reasonably related to
the public health, the program adopted by Chicago was a
reasonable exercise of the police power.
The Illinois Supreme Court is the most recent state
court to uphold the constitutionality of a planned and
controlled scheme of adding fluorides to the public water
supply. For a collection of cases see, Annot., 43 A.L.R.
2d 453 (1955). Also see for complete discussions, Nichols,
Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 So. CAL. L.
REV. 158 (1959); Comment, Legal Aspects of the Fluoridation of Public Drinking Water, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 343
(1955) and Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Fluoridation of Water Supplies, 38 NoTRE DAME LAW. 71 (1962).
In Maryland artificial fluoridation of the public water
supply has been in effect in many communities since 1952.
As of May 1963, approximately 90% of all the water being
used by the public from public supplies and systems in
Maryland had been treated with controlled amounts of
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fluoride. See Md. State Dept. of Health Bull., Vol. 35, No. 5
(May 1963). The power to do this is provided generally
in 4 MD. CODE Art. 43, § 388 (1957). This section gives state
and local boards of health power to control and to make
regulations concerning the waters of the state ". . . in so far
as their sanitary and physical condition affect the public
health or comfort ..... " There are no reported court decisions of the constitutionality of fluoridation in Maryland.
For further reference, especially as to the contrary view
that fluoridation goes beyond the legitimate police power
of the state, see: Auchter, Fluoridation: A Study of
Philosophies,46 A.B.A.J. 523 (1960).
Creditor's Rights - Quantum Meruit Suit For Professional Services Will Support Garnishee Process Though
Amount Of Claim Is Not Ascertained. Welsh v. Woods,
........ Haw ......... 386 P. 2d 886 (1963). Appellant's suit was
based on quantum meruit for professional legal services.
Garnishee process was served, which defendant moved to
quash, on the grounds that the claim was unliquidated and
not the type to support garnishment. The defendant argued
that the applicable statute, Rev. Laws Haw. 1955, § 237-1
(Supp. 1961), limiting garnishment to actions brought by
a "creditor" against his "debtor", restricted the meaning
of "debt" to liquidated claims. In overruling the trial court,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that such a claim was
within the meaning of the statute, since the creditordebtor relationship could exist even where the amount
of the claim was not ascertained and reasonable witnesses
might differ as to the amount of the claim. One judge
dissented, arguing that ".... the instant claim is still clearly
unliquidated in that its ascertainment requires the exercise
of judgment, and not mere calculation." In support the
dissenting judge cited several Maryland cases (referred to
below) and 2 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 415 (5th ed.
1925). The majority defined debt as a promise, whether
express or implied, to pay as much as certain goods or labor
were worth. As an action in quantum meruit was an action
to enforce an implied promise to pay, it followed that garnishment might be used. In other words, such a claim as
appellant's in the instant suit could be within the meaning
of the word "debt", though not readily ascertainable or
liquidated. See Hall v. Parry, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 40, 118
S.W. 561 (1909) and Annot., 12 A.L.R. 2d 787, 810 (1949).
On this basis it was unjust, said the majority, to bar a
creditor from this remedy, because there was no express
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agreement that had ascertained the amount of his claim,
when the amount of the debtor's liability could and would
be determined by later appropriate judicial procedure.
In Maryland, under a set of similar facts, an amount
claimed in quantum meruit for professional services
rendered has been declared unliquidated and consequently,
not within the contemplation of "debt" as used in the
Maryland attachment statute, see MD. RuLE G41 and
Steuart v. Chappell,98 Md. 527, 57 Atl. 17 (1904). However,
attachment or garnishment may be allowed where ex contractu damages are unliquidated, if the strict provisions,
including posting of bond by the plaintiff, of Mi. RuLEs G41
and G42 are followed. A well-considered opinion, with a
complete discussion of the problem of the meaning of debt
as used in the above Maryland statute, may be found in
Blick v. Mercantile Trust Co., 113 Md. 487, 77 Atl. 844
(1910). For commentary, including the required liquidation of various types of claims, see Rhynhart, Attachments In the People's Court of Baltimore City, 14 MD. L.
REv. 235 (1954). Also see, Comment, 34 U. DET. L. J. 428
(1957).
Criminal Law - American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code Test For Insanity Adopted In The Tenth Circuit.
Wion v. United States, 325 F. 2d 420 (10th Cir.
1963). Appellant was charged with causing an explosive
to be delivered by mail with intent to injure the addressee.
From a conviction in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, he appealed, challenging the instructions of the court concerning his mental capacity to
commit the crime charged. The trial court's charge to the
jury, in accord with another Tenth Circuit decision, Coffman v. United States, 290 F. 2d 212 (10th Cir. 1961), was
basically in the form of the M'Naghten Rule combined
with the "irresistable impulse test". The court in Wion
had been requested to instruct the jury in accord with
the test prevailing in the Third Circuit, see United States
v. Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), a test substantially incorporated in the American Law Institute's MODEL
PENAL CODE

Section 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft, 1962).

After finding that the components of Coffman were also included in the Model Penal Code Test, the court of appeals
selected the wording of the American Law Institute's Test
as the construction which would be most easily understood
when submitted to a jury: "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
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of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law."
Maryland has traditionally followed the M'Naghten
Rule, see State v. Spencer, 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809 (1888);
7 MLE Criminal Law, § 22 (1961). In 1958, a committee
was appointed by the Legislative Council of Maryland to
study the laws for the commitment of mentally ill persons.
The committee adopted a test similar to the Model Penal
Code Test, taking careful note to exclude defective delinquents, as provided for in 3 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 31B,
§ 5, from its coverage. Other minor changes are the substitution of "deficiency of intelligence" for "defect" and
"sufficient" for "substantial" in a formulation otherwise
identical with the Model Penal Code Test. In January,
1962, the Bar Association formally approved the test, see
Transactions of the Maryland State Bar Association, MidWinter Meeting, 1962, pp. 46-71, 307-311. This test was
brought before the Maryland State Legislature in the Fall
of 1962 but died in the House Judiciary Committee, having
never been brought to the floor for debate. This has been
the usual fate of any proposed charge of the M'Naghten
Rule in Maryland; however, the bill is again scheduled to
be presented to the legislature. For further reference see:
McDonald v. United States, 312 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists,41 IowA L. REv. 485 (1956); Sobeloff,
Insanity and the Criminal Law: From M'Naghten to Durham and Beyond, 15 MD.L. REv. 93 (1955); Symposium on
Insanity, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 477 (1962); Comment, M'Naghten Remains Irreplacable: Recent Events in the Law of
Incapacity, 50 GEo. L.J. 105 (1961); 15 M. L. REv. 44
(1955); 45 A.L.R. 2d 1447 (1956).
Perpetuities - Leasehold Estate To Commence "On
Completion Of" Building Not Void Under The Rule Against
Perpetuities. Wong v. Digrazia, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241, 386 P.
2d 817 (1963). Plaintiff and defendant entered into an
agreement, part of which provided that defendant agreed
to lease to plaintiff, for a period of 10 years, a building to
be constructed by defendant. The lease was to commence
"upon completion" of the building. A dispute arose between the parties and plaintiff sought rescission. Plaintiff
relied primarily on the case of Haggerty v. City of Oakland,
161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P. 2d 957 (1958), which had held
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a similarly worded lease void under the rule against perpetuities. The court construed the "upon completion"
clause to mean that the lessee's interest vested only upon
such completion.
The Supreme Court of California found that the lease
was not void under the rule and held, to the extent the
Haggerty case expressed a contrary position, it was overruled. The court decided that the lease imposed on defendant an obligation to complete construction within a reasonable time and that all rights under the lease agreement
would be established within 21 years, for a reasonable time
in these circumstances was necessarily less than 21 years.
The dissent pointed out that the rule against perpetuities
has never depended and should not now depend upon
reasonable probabilities as they existed at the time of the
lease agreement or as they developed afterwards. To introduce the idea of reasonable probabilities into this area of
the law was, said the dissent, to encourage litigation and
confuse the law in an area where the law should be well
settled.
"On completion" leases are a fairly new idea in commercial development. They are used extensively in
shopping center leases. The Haggerty case was the first
case in which their validity was tested on the appellate
level. The case was not particularly well received. See
Leach, Perpetuities:New Absurdity, Judicialand Statutory
Correctives, 73 HAV. L. REV. 1318 (1960); Note, 47 CAL.
L. REv. 197 (1959) and 10 HASTINGS L. J. 439 (1959). It
would now seem that the California court, in the instant
case, has decided not to [adhere to] such a "rigid mechanistic operation of the rule". See also, Southern Airway
Co. v. DeKalb County, 101 Ga. App. 689, 115 S.E. 2d 207
(1960); Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F. 2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1961) and City of Santa Cruz v. McGregor,2 Cal. Rptr. 727
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
Service Of Process - Term "Dwelling House" In
Federal Rule Liberally Construed Where Defendant Has
Actually Received Notice. KarIsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.
2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963). Service of process on Rabinowitz
was effected by leaving a copy with his wife at their Maryland home, three weeks after Rabinowitz had preceded his
family in a move to Arizona, where he had bought a home,
intending never to return to Maryland. Defendant's family
had remained in the Maryland house to complete moving
arrangements and sale of house, during which time process
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was received by wife and communicated to defendant. The
issue involved was whether the substituted personal
service effected constituted sufficient compliance with FED.
R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1), which states that service can be had on
an individual, "by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable
age and discretion.. . ." The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, 31 F.R.D. 234 (Md. 1962),
quashed service, holding the Maryland house was not, at
that time, defendant's "dwelling house or usual place of
abode", and strongly implying that for it to be such, defendant must have had the intention of returning. The
Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing, saw the salient
factor to be Rabinowitz's actual receipt of notice, and held
that where actual notice of the action and the duty to defend had been received, FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1) should
be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the
jurisdiction of the court, insuring an opportunity for a trial
on the merits. See Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F. 2d 687 (6th
Cir. 1942). Cases on the interpretation of this rule are collected in 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 4.11, at 929
et seq. (2d ed. 1962) and in 1 BARRON and HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 177 (1960).
The court
observed that defendant's intention to return or not (apparently relied on by the District Court and mentioned
in many of the case decisions) serves to indicate the likelihood that notice will actually be received, but should not
be used as a test in itself to determine the place of abode.
There are many state decisions on point and they are in
hopeless conflict. See State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffernan,
142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145, 127 A.L.R. 1263 (1940).
Torts - Criminal Conversation And Alienation Of
Affections Found To Be Two Distinct Torts. DiBlasio v.
Kolodner and Rezak . ....... Md ......... , 197 A. 2d 245 (1964).
The defendant, Rezak, through his lawyer, Kolodner, instituted an action for criminal conversation with his wife
against DiBlasio. Some of the allegations in Rezak's complaint pertained to an action for alienation of affections,
which was abolished by 7 MD. CODE Art. 75c, §§ 1-6, 8, 9
(1957). Because of this error in his pleading, the trial
court instructed Rezak to amend his complaint, deleting
the references to alienation of affections. Rezak complied
with this order, and proceeded on a theory of criminal
conversation. Rezak's claim against DiBlasio was still
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pending when DiBlasio brought suit against him and his
lawyer Kolodner for libel in regard to the statements
made about him in the first action. DiBlasio contended
that since the tort of alienation of affections had been
abolished, a claim for criminal conversation had also been
eliminated. Proceeding on the theory that the statute had
abolished both torts, DiBlasio argued that the statements
made against him concerning alienation of affections were
not privileged as they were not part of a judicial proceeding, there being no cause of action on which Rezak could
have sued.
The Court of Appeals rejected DiBlasio's contentions.
Judge Brune pointed out that the two torts have different
elements which distinguish them and do not make them
one and the same action. Since the statute abolished only
an action for alienation of affections and made no mention
of criminal conversation, the court reasoned that as the
two torts were distinct from each other, a statute applying
to one would not apply to the other (in the observance of)
an express provision so stipulating. Judge Brune cited a
Pennsylvania case, Antonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69
A. 2d 102 (1949), which reached an identical conclusion in
construing a similar statute. The court then determined
that the alleged libelous statements were privileged even
though deleted, because they were related to the judicial
proceeding. See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A. 2d
54 (1962).
In reaching this result, Maryland has followed the
pattern common throughout the country of strictly construing statutes abolishing actions for interference with
domestic relations. See, PRossER, TORTS § 103, at 698 (2d
ed. 1955). Because both torts involve the loss of the right
to the consortium of the wife there has been a tendency to
consider them as identical, but the physical violation involved in criminal conversation, not required in alienation
of affections, distinguishes the former from the latter. 42
C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 668, at 320 (1944). For further
reference see: Root v. Root, 31 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Cal.
1940); 12 M.L.E. Husband & Wife § 9 (1961); 27 Am. Jur.
Husband & Wife § 523 (1940).
Trade Regulation - Deceptive Claims About Caloric
Content Of Bread Held To Be False Advertising. National
Bakers Services Inc. v. FederalTrade Commission, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Case.) f 71,061, at 79,196 (7th Cir.
1964). The case arose as an appeal by National Bakers
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Services Inc. from a ruling of the Federal Trade Commission ordering it to cease and desist from making certain
claims concerning the bread it produced. National's advertising claims were found by the FTC to be "false advertisements" which constituted unfair and deceptive acts in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914). The appellant, in its various advertising slogans, played on such words as "dieting", "sweet,
slim trim lines" and "stay slender". Included in practically
all of its advertisements was the factual claim that there
were "only about 46 calories in an 18 gram slice." As a fact
without disputs, there was no significance difference in the
caloric content of "Hollywood Bread" and other competing
white breads. Also without dispute was the fact that standard brands of bread were normally sold sliced in 23 gram
slices which contained approximately 63 calories. Putting
these figures together, the FTC and the Circuit Court of
Appeals found that, "[Tihe only reason that 'Hollywood'
bread contains approximately 46 calories per slice instead
of approximately 63 calories is because Hollywood bread is
more thinly sliced." On this basis, the FTC found, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, that, since the public had no
conception of the gram weight of a standard slice, this advertising conveyed the impression that "Hollywood Bread"
was lower in calories than competing brands, which it was
not, and therefore constituted "false advertisements."
Advertisements which are literally true, but which
tend to create a false impression, may be prohibited. The
truth, properly framed, can be used to deceive and mislead.
See, Rhodes PharmacalCo. v. FTC, 208 F. 2d 382 (7th Cir.
1953) and Koch v. FTC, 206 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953). "....
[R]epresentations made or suggested . . ." can be used in
determining whether a statement is misleading or not, see
15 U.S.C. § 55A (1950). For further reference see: Annot.,
65 A.L.R. 2d 225 (1959); Barnes, Law of Trade PracticeFalse Advertising, 23 OMo ST. L. J. 597 (1962) and Gettleman, Advertising and The Federal Trade Commission, 7
Antitrust Bull. 259 (1962).

